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Following	on	the	path	of	questioning	that	Lampland	laid	out	in	The	Object	
of	Labor	(1995),	The	Value	of	Labor	delves	deeper	into	the	technopolitical	history	
of	the	commodification	of	agrarian	labour	in	Hungary.	Previously,	Lampland	has	
maintained	that	the	individualized	concepts	of	time,	money,	and	labour	imposed	by	
socialist	 collectivization	bore	 continuity	with	pre‐socialist	 agrarian	modernization,	
and	were	instrumental	to	the	transition	to	capitalism.	In	The	Value	of	Labor,	she	
follows	 expert	 and	 policy	 debates	 in	 1930s	work	 science,	 and	 points	 out	 their	
continuities	with	the	institutionalization	of	the	work	unit	in	the	Stalinist	phase	of	
collectivization.	 Such	 continuities	 contradict	 the	 Cold	 War	 concept	 of	 Stalinist	
modernization	as	Soviet	models	imposed	from	scratch.	Targeting	debates	in	the	
fields	 of	 Science	 and	Technology	 Studies	 (STS),	 history	 of	 economics,	 and	 Cold	
War	history,	Lampland	draws	three	interconnected	conclusions:	1)	an	emphasis	
on	the	role	of	markets	in	determining	the	value	of	labour	obscures	the	historical	
construction	of	the	knowledge,	policy,	and	material	infrastructures	that	perform	
its	 commodification;	2)	performativity	of	 economics	 should	also	be	understood	
through	the	history	of	the	material	infrastructures	of	scientific	intervention;	and	
3)	the	Cold	War	periodization	that	separates	socialist	and	capitalist	modernization	
does	 not	 stand	 in	 face	 of	 the	 historical	 continuity	 between	 pre‐socialist	 and	
socialist	infrastructures	of	labour	commodification.	
While	 Lampland’s	 conclusions	 primarily	 address	 debates	 within	 the	
above	 fields,	her	 findings	are	 interesting	and	relevant	contributions	 to	other	
fields	too,	where	many	of	her	conclusions	are	shared.	In	the	field	of	debate	on	
the	interconnected	historical	development	of	capitalism,	especially	in	the	 tradition	
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and	debates	around	the	world‐systems	approach,	semi‐peripheral	modernization	is	
analysed	as	a	process	of	integration	into	capitalism	as	a	global	system	(Wallerstein,	
1974).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 that	 socio‐historical	 process,	 the	 commodification	 of	
agricultural	labour	in	Hungary	that	Lampland	traces	can	be	seen	as	part	of	a	long‐
term	 social	 transformation	 structured	 by	 penetrating	 global	 forces	 of	 capitalist	
development.	The	social	positions	of	 the	actors	whose	debates	Lampland	analyses	
can	 be	 identified	within	 that	 larger	 process.	 Lampland’s	 remarks	 on	 structural	
continuities	between	the	interwar	period	and	Stalinism,	as	well	as	her	descriptions	of	
various	 ideological	 and	moral	 standpoints	 within	 agrarian	 debates,	 resonate	 well	
with	a	world‐system	perspective	on	the	structural	process	of	capitalist	 integration	
(Frank,	1977).	Just	like	Lampland’s	conclusion	on	continuity,	this	perspective	also	
contradicts	the	Cold	War	paradigm	of	treating	socialist	and	capitalist	modernization	
as	 separated	 entities.	 In	 what	 follows,	 we	 bring	 several	 examples	 where	 we	
think	the	resonance	between	the	two	perspectives	opens	promising	possibilities	for	
understanding	long‐term	local	social	transformation	across	political	systems.	
	
	
Large	estates	and	the	question	of	the	land	reform	
	
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 world‐economic	 integration,	 the	 structural	
rigidity	of	large‐scale	farming	in	Hungary	is	rooted	in	the	country’s	integration	
as	a	satellite	agro‐supplier	to	industrializing	core	countries	at	the	early	stage	
of	capitalist	development	(Pach,	1963).	As	this	type	of	semi‐peripheral	integration	
in	the	international	division	of	labour	favoured	large‐sale	farming	for	export,	
it	engendered	a	concentration	of	land	in	the	hands	of	a	few	powerful	manorial	
landowners,	 and	 the	 corresponding	 growth	of	 a	 class	of	 landless	 agriculture	
labourers.		
One	notable	example	of	political	clashes	that	Lampland	mentions	from	
the	19th	century	was	the	one	between	large	landowners	with	rising	manorial	
economies	 and	 the	middle	 segments	 of	 the	 land‐holder	 nobility.	 The	 latter’s	
estates	 were	 not	 large	 enough	 to	 compete	 in	 the	 world	 market,	 they	 were	
undercapitalized	 and	 therefore	 unable	 to	modernize	 their	 estates,	 and	 their	
production	depended	on	coercive	forms	of	labour	control	and	market	protection.	
As	such,	they	were	interested	in	the	formation	of	the	coerced	cash‐crop	labour	
force	that	Engels	(1882)	called	the	second	serfdom	in	the	Prussian	context,	so	
as	to	stay	competitive	on	the	agrarian	market.	In	the	first	half	of	the	19th	century,	
political	debates	fuelled	by	these	class	dynamics	among	land‐holders	focused	
on	issues	like	the	juridical	status	of	the	serfs,	and	the	role	of	the	credit	system	
in	a	predominantly	feudal	legislation,	in	a	situation	where	the	commercialization	
of	land	had	become	essential.	One	of	the	famous	advocates	of	the	abolition	of	
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serfdom	 and	 the	 commercialization	 of	 manorial	 lands	 to	 improve	 financial	
credibility	was	 István	Széchenyi,	one	of	 the	biggest	 land‐holders	of	 the	 time.	As	
one	characteristic	point	in	the	debate	around	agrarian	modernization,	Lampland	
mentions	Széchenyi’s	stance	for	the	commodification	of	labour	(the	liberation	of	
the	serfs)	and	the	commercialization	of	land	(the	expansion	of	the	credit	system)	as	
an	early	example	for	technocratic	modernization	(Lampland,	2016).	Viewed	from	
the	perspective	of	the	historical	dynamics	of	capitalist	integration,	that	stance	stood	
in	line	with	the	economic	position	of	large	landholders	exposed	to	pressures	from	
the	world	market.	 It	was	 their	 interest	 to	create	a	 labour	market	based	 less	on	
coercion	 and	more	 on	 the	 wage	 form	 of	 labour	 control,	 and	 to	 gain	 access	 to	
financial	instruments	such	as	state	bonds	or	private	capital.	Széchenyi’s	stance	was	
heavily	opposed	by	his	fellow	contemporaries	with	smaller	land	holdings	that	were	
not	in	the	position	to	implement	competitive	innovations,	and	feared	losing	their	
manpower	together	with	their	own	social	position	after	the	abolition	of	serfdom.	
On	 the	other	hand,	Széchenyi	 firmly	opposed	 land	reform.	 If	manorial	 land	had	
been	distributed	amongst	the	agrarian	workforce	simultaneously	with	the	abolition	
of	 serfdom,	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 wage	 form	 would	 have	 been	 impeded,	 as	
workers	would	not	be	 free	 in	 the	double	sense	of	Marx’s	 term.	This	would	have	
harmed	the	large	estates’	interests	that	pointed	towards	the	commercialization	of	
land	and	the	commodification	of	labour.	
A	similarly	dynamic	social	fragmentation	happened	among	the	peasantry.	
Their	number	had	been	on	a	steady	decline	for	centuries,	and	by	the	19th	century,	
semi‐proletarian	agricultural	labourers	outnumbered	peasants	by	a	great	margin	
(Gunst,	1998).	However,	a	thin	stratum	of	the	peasantry	managed	to	acquire	land	
either	by	purchase	or	lease	in	order	to	produce	for	the	local	markets.	Due	to	that	
process,	 enormous	 estates	 and	 middle‐sized	 farms	 coexisted	 in	 the	 rural	
agricultural	 landscape	 in	the	 interwar	period.	Landless	villagers	were	hired	not	
only	 by	 landlords,	 but	 also	 by	 land‐bearing	 peasants.	 In	 the	 interwar	 period,	
Hungarian	narodnik	intellectuals	heroized	land‐bearing	peasants	in	their	political	
agenda	 for	 land	 reform.	 Their	 social	 status	 was	 universalized	 in	 an	 ideal	 of	 a	
Hungarian	 third	 way	 agrarian	 development	 (neither	 capitalist,	 nor	 socialist),	
which	 they	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 garden	 economy	 (Németh,	 1943).The	
term	of	peasant	embourgoisement	(cf.	Erdei,	1973)	was	created	to	describe	the	
possibility	 of	 universal	 social	 flourishment	 in	 Garden	 Hungary.	 This	 was	 an	
idealization	with	a	narrow	focus	on	one	particular	class	within	a	process	pointing	
towards	the	concentration	of	land	and	the	formation	of	agrarian	wage	labour.	It	is	
this	ideological	moment	Lampland	identifies	as	(left)	political	alternatives	being	
articulated	 for	 a	 land	 reform	 that	 would	 have	 benefited	 a	 free‐holder	
peasantry	in	the	1930s.	After	the	devastation	of	the	war,	the	political	agenda	
of	 the	 narodniks	 was	 strong	 and	 popular,	 and	 helped	 to	 restore	 the	 rural	
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social	order.	The	land	reform	they	initiated,	which	enjoyed	the	backing	of	the	
post‐war	coalition,	including	the	communists,	targeted	large	estates.	However,	
the	 social	 transformation	 which	 the	 Moscow‐backed	 communist	 party	 had	
envisioned	 and	 later	 applied	 was	 not	 peasant	 embourgeoisment,	 but	 the	
Stalinist	 model	 of	 industrialization,	 for	 which	 they	 needed	 a	 completely	
different	approach	to	agriculture.	
Lampland	 emphasizes	 that	 rather	 than	 a	 genuinely	 ‘Socialist’	 turn,	
Stalinist	collectivization	featured	a	strong	continuity	with	previous	structures	
of	 estates	 and	 agrarian	 labour.	 Indeed,	 the	 structural	 push	 for	 large‐scale,	
increasingly	 technological	agriculture	remained	 in	place,	while	 the	 increased	
productivity	of	agriculture	was	used	for	a	next	phase	of	structural	integration	
in	the	world	capitalist	economy:	the	effort	to	catch	up	with	the	industrialization	of	
core	 countries.	 The	 ‘free’	 agricultural	work	 of	 interwar	 estates,	 in	 fact	 coupled	
with	 repressive	 forms	 of	 labour	 control,	 including	 slavery,	 coerced	 cash‐crop	
labour	or	semi‐wage	forms	depending	on	patronal	ties,	found	its	continuation	in	a	
proletarianization	 process	 which,	 however	 forceful,	 did	 not	 manage	 to	 fully	
penetrate	the	wage	form	into	the	peasant	class,	and	coupled	brutal	exploitation	of	
the	agrarian	sector	for	the	sake	of	industry	with	pushing	individual	producers	
to	 complement	 their	 livelihood	 with	 farming	 small	 plots.	 This	 semi‐proletarian	
type	of	agrarian	labour	has	been	described	as	a	lasting	characteristic	of	semi‐
peripheries	 across	 cycles	 of	 world‐economic	 integration	 (Dunaway,	 2012).	
That	debates	over	the	measurement	of	labour	value	or	assessing	conditions	of	
migrant	 workers	 were	 similar	 in	 geographically	 distant	 locations,	 as	 Lampland	
notes	 e.g.	 between	 Hungary	 and	Mexico	 (Lampland,	 2016:94),	 follows	 from	
typical	tensions	of	the	integration	process	 in	similar	world‐market	positions.	
The	continuity	of	 that	process	 implies	a	 localized	 story	of	uneven	 development,	
bridging	 early	 forms	 of	 the	 second	 serfdom	 in	 the	 16th	 century,	 manorial	
serfdom	 in	 late	 19th	 century,	 and	 the	 forceful	 exploitation	 of	 peasants	 by	 state‐
socialist	cooperatives	in	the	middle	of	the	20th	century.	From	a	world‐economic	
point	 of	 view,	 the	 continuous	 sweep	 of	modernization	 Lampland	 points	 out	
coalesced	with	global	trends,	as	former	agrarian	social	structures	were	replaced	
by	 industrialization,	 urbanization	 and	 proletarianization	 –	 although	 amongst	
different	 institutional	 settings.	 The	 transformation	 Lampland	 follows	 in	 the	
commodification	of	agricultural	labour	in	the	1930s	and	1940‐50s	in	Hungary	
appears	 as	 an	 element	 of	 a	 shift	 in	 integration	 characteristic	 to	 semi‐peripheral	
positions	across	the	globe:	industrial	development	based	on	domestic	exploitation	
of	agriculture.	Her	focus	on	the	technopolitical	implementation	of	that	integration	
carries	a	relevance	to	that	scale	of	comparison.	
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Morals,	technopolitics,	and	expert	interests	
	
Some	differences	in	assessment	follow	from	the	difference	between	an	
STS‐based	focus	on	contingent	histories	of	knowledge	production,	and	a	focus	
on	 the	world‐economic	 conditions	 of	 the	 same	 institutional	 process.	What	 a	
focus	on	global	integration	would	link	to	positions	of	speakers	in	the	interest	
structure	of	agricultural	transformation	–	as	in	the	case	of	Széchenyi’s	relation	
to	money	in	agriculture,	or	in	the	case	of	villagers’	positions	on	collectivization	
(Lampland,	 2016)	 –	 Lampland	 lays	 out	 as	 differences	 of	 moral	 imperatives	
and	principles	of	social	cohabitation	(Lampland,	2016).		
A	difference	regarding	the	significance	of	 technopolitical	structures	also	
follows	from	the	difference	of	perspectives.	At	certain	points	Lampland	seems	to	
associate	 technopolitical	 structures	with	a	responsibility	over	distortions	of	 the	
local	modernization	process.	For	example,	 following	 the	narratives	of	a	 specific	
strain	of	literature	on	historical	context	(Berend	and	Ránki,1958;	Borhi,	2004;	Pető	
and	Szakács,1985;	Valuch,	1996,	etc.),	she	portrays	the	history	of	Stalinist	economic	
policies	 as	 a	 struggle	 between	 rational	 expertise	 and	 ideological	 industrialist	
politics,	like	in	the	case	of	István	Friss	and	the	Institute	of	Economics	(KTI)	under	
the	 reformist	 government	 of	 Imre	 Nagy	 (Lampland,	 2016).	 Viewed	 from	 the	
perspective	of	world	economic	integration,	this	interpretation	seems	to	take	sides	
between	the	contradictory	effects	of	one	and	the	same	modernizing	effort.	From	the	
latter	perspective,	the	contradiction	between	these	two	standpoints	does	not	follow	
from	a	difference	between	ideological	and	rational	thought,	but	from	two	different	
rationalities	connected	to	the	internal	contradictions	of	the	socialist	catching‐up	
effort.	State	socialism,	similar	to	other	state‐led	industrial	development	projects	
in	the	global	semi‐peripheries	in	the	post‐war	world	economic	cycle,	 involved	a	
catching‐up	effort	in	a	situation	of	relative	lack	of	capital	and	technology	vis‐à‐vis	
the	centres	of	the	world	economy.	A	characteristic	contradiction	of	such	efforts	is	
that	they	come	under	the	simultaneous	pressures	to	develop	technology	in	order	
to	improve	their	terms	of	trade	on	the	long	term,	and	to	rely	on	existing	levels	of	
technology	 with	 immediate	 export	 possibilities	 to	 pay	 for	 technology	 imports	
(often	provided	by	agriculture).	The	alternation	between	the	two	strategies,	coupled	
with	position	 struggles	within	 the	 apparatus,	 is	 a	 long‐standing	 characteristic	 of	
such	efforts,	as	is	the	problem	of	external	debt	following	from	the	failure	to	solve	
the	 contradiction	 between	 technology	 imports	 and	 export	 pressure.	 From	 this	
perspective,	 it	 is	 not	 specific	 policy	 schemes	 or	 technopolitical	 agents	who	 are	
responsible	 for	 the	 ‘distortions’	 of	 the	 modernization	 process,	 but	 the	 uneven	
nature	 of	 capitalist	 development	 globally,	 which	 systematically	 locks	 semi‐
peripheral	catching‐up	efforts	in	the	contradictions	represented	in	the	struggles	
between	those	respective	agents.	
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Finally,	Lampland’s	demonstration	that	agricultural	expert	knowledge	
created	 and	 propagated	 before	 1945	 was	 finally	 implemented	 within	 the	
structures	of	the	party	state	also	opens	the	question	of	the	position	of	experts	
within	 the	material	 process	 of	world	 economic	 integration.	 The	 story	 of	 the	
materialization	 of	 1930s	 agricultural	 expert	 knowledge,	 and	 its	 intriguing	
transgression	of	the	temporal	and	political	borders	of	a	Cold	War	framework,	
is	 coupled	 with	 a	 story	 of	 a	 professional	 class	 struggling	 for	 a	 new	 expert	
infrastructure,	 and	 later	 occupying	 positions	 within	 it.	 In	 the	 1930s	 experts	
propagated	 modernization	 measures	 based	 on	 Western	 models	 in	 a	 situation	
where	this	knowledge	was	not	yet	required	either	by	 landlords	or	by	the	state.	
This	 might	 create	 the	 impression	 that	 ideas	 for	 agricultural	 modernization	
appeared	 as	 a	 bodyless	 technical	 knowledge,	which	 appeared	 locally,	 struggled	
for	self‐implementation,	and	then	got	materialized	in	historical	technostructures.	
Viewed	from	the	perspective	of	class	dynamics	within	world‐economic	integration,	
on	the	other	hand,	the	historical	’body’	of	experts	proposing	modernization	measures	
before	being	integrated	into	real	relations	of	power	seems	to	be	a	regular	feature	of	
East	European	professional	classes.	The	historical	phenomenon	of	local	intellectuals	
stepping	 up	 as	 propagators	 and	 initiators	 of	 modernization	 projects	 has	 been	
linked	 to	 the	 limits	 of	middle	 class	 development	 in	 a	 semi‐peripheral	 position,	
where	ambitions	for	middle	class	life	standards	on	par	with	Western	models	are	
recurrently	 channelled	 towards	 political	 projects	 and	 state	 positions	 (Janos,	
2000).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 ’cyclical	movement	 of	 intellectuals	 in	 Eastern	 Europe’	
across	positions	like	the	Bildungsbürgertum	of	the	19th	century,	vanguards	of	the	
communist	 modernization	 process,	 or	 the	 ‘second	 Bildungsbürgertum’	 of	 the	
1980s	and	1990s	(Szelényi	and	King,	2004)	is	tied	to	the	historical	dynamics	of	
this	specifically	situated	professional	class,	and	its	changing	relations	to	the	power	
structures	that	incorporate	or	exclude	them.	How	expertise	relates	to	geopolitical	
hierarchies	and	local	development	interests	is	a	question	entangled	into	complex	
layers	of	alliance	and	conflict	within	changing	modes	of	world‐economic	integration.	
It	is	also	a	question	that	touches	upon	the	generic	issue	of	the	social	conditions	of	
social	knowledge,	on	which	Lampland’s	 case	study	offers	a	 formidable	window	
for	reflection	and	comparison.	
	
	
Technopolitics	in	global	integration	
	
Lampland	emphasizes	that	her	research	uncovers	a	contingent	history	
of	 the	 material	 implementation	 of	 scientific	 knowledge,	 where	 contingency	
can	explain	why	similar	formalizing	processes	can	lead	to	different	outcomes,	
and	thus	serve	as	a	historically	and	culturally	sensitive	base	 for	comparison,	
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beyond	Cold	War	 frameworks.	 In	 this	approach,	 it	 is	historical	contingencies	
of	 institutional	 constructs	 that	 create	multiplicities	 in	 the	 global	modernization	
process.	Viewed	as	part	of	global	integration,	local	institutional	processes	appear	
as	contingent	not	only	upon	their	own	histories	but	also	on	conditions	set	by	the	
interrelated	 and	 uneven	 process	 of	 global	 modernization.	 In	 the	 latter	 sense,	
deficiencies	and	contradictions	of	semi‐peripheral	modernization,	debates	on	
the	role	of	large	estates,	the	obligations	of	the	peasantry,	or	the	monetization	
of	 agricultural	 labour	 are	 not	 only	 locally	 conflictual	 practices	 or	 competing	
knowledges,	 but	 represent	 various	 conflictual	 interest	 positions	within	 local	
constellations	of	the	capitalist	world	economy.	While	it	was	not	Lampland’s	aim	
to	analyse	the	commodification	of	agricultural	labour	from	the	perspective	of	the	
global	capitalist	process,	we	think	that	connecting	the	debates	and	technopolitical	
processes	she	reconstructs	to	positions	and	tensions	of	global	 integration	could	
powerfully	contribute	to	the	same	aims	she	follows:	to	transcend	the	ideological	
periodization	of	the	Cold	War	framework,	and	move	towards	globally	comparative	
approaches	that	account	for	the	materiality	of	the	social	process.	
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